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the community property so as to make them the separate property
of her husband. In either case the procedure is the same, i.e., it
requires two deeds-the first from the husband and the wife to a
trustee; the second from the trustee to the husband as his separate
property. The conveyance can be as a gift, or for a consideration
from the husband's separate estate.
Husband and wife cannot change the status of marital prop-
erty by mere agreement; there must be a conveyance recognized
by law. The courts are quick to declare void an effort to change
separate property to community property by agreement through
the guise of deeds. If a deed of one spouses's separate property to
a trustee and then a deed from the trustee back to the husband
and wife, declare that their purpose is to convert separate property
into community property, the whole transaction will be void, but
if there are no such express recitals, the transaction makes the
spouses co-tenants. There cannot be a gift of separate property to
the community. And finally, there is a possibility that separate
property can be changed to community property by a conveyance
to the community in exchange for a consideration from commu-
nity funds. Howard Coghlan.
PROBLEMS CONCERNING ADMINISTRATION OF
COMMUNITY PROPERTY
INTRODUCTIONOF course community property ceases to be such when either
spouse dies. In case of intestacy and no children, all such
property belongs to the survivor; if there are children, they in-
herit the decedent's half, and a co-tenancy with the survivor results.1
In case of a will, the beneficiaries therein get the decedent's half
1 TEx. Rrv. Civ. STAT. (Vernon's, 1948), Art. 2578. "Children" is used in the text




(even though they are outsiders-subject only to homestead rights,
if any, in the survivor and children), and a co-tenancy with the
survivor results. In all these situations, such property of course
remains subject to the community debts and therefore subject to
administration to pay such debts.
What are "community debts"? They are debts that are collect-
ible from non-exempt community property. They therefore appar-
ently include any debt contracted by the husband, before or after
marriage, and any debt similarly contracted by the wife which
she does not avoid, and any tort liability of either spouse, before
or after marriage. That is, as to the wife, all premarital debts are
included; all postnuptial debts which are authorized by statute
are included; unauthorized debts after marriage-which are void-
able-seem to be included if she elects not to avoid them. The
above debts of the husband are collectible from all the commu-
nity property except four items produced by the wife or her prop-
erty; the above debts of the wife (except necessaries, which are
ordinarily more broadly collectible) are collectible from those
four items of community property, only. (Of course, the debts of
each spouse are collectible also from the separate property of such
spouse.) The above tort liability of each spouse is collectible as
debts are, or in some situations collectible from the entire com-
munity property.2
If there are no children and also no community debts, no com-
munity administration is possible. If there are children and com-
munity debts, there are three or more possibilities: community
administration by the survivor without qualifying in court; or
community administration by the survivor by so qualifying; or an
ordinary administration, by the decedent's executor or adminis-
trator, alone or coexisting with one of the preceding. If there are
children but no community debts, the only possible type of com-
2 As to the preceding paragraph, see comment in this issue The Liability of Marital
Property for the Contracts and Torts of Husband and Wife. See also Art. 4620 and
Art. 3661; also the 1848 Statute (4 Gammel 469), the meaning of which is apparently
unchanged by Art. 4620.
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munity administration would be by the survivor's qualifying in
court.
Where either spouse is adjudged insane, the other spouse may
control community property (which continues to be such) much
as in the case of death;' but that entire topic is omitted from dis-
cussion here.
The problems of community administration are numerous and
difficult. Some of the major ones will be discussed, under the two
headings of the non-qualifying community survivor and the com-
munity survivor who qualifies in the probate court under the
statutes.
1. THE NON-QUALIFYING COMMUNITY SURVIVOR
What Powers Does Either Community Survivor Have
Without Court Action?
Nature and Elements
It is well recognized that, for the purpose of paying community
debts and settling community obligations, the survivor, husband
or wife, can convey the former community property without any
court action whatsoever. 4
It is the existence of community obligations which generates
the power, and, somewhat on the analogy of a surviving partner,
the courts regularly have conceded the surviving spouse's right to
sell and convey for the purpose of settling those debts,5 or, what
8 TEX. Rev. CIv. STAT. (Vernon's, 1948). Art. 3662.
4 Shell Oil Co., Inc. v. Howth, 138 Tex. 357, 159 S. W. (2d) 483 (1942) ; Grebe v.
First State Bank of Bishop, 136 Tex. 226, 150 S. W. (2d) 64 (1941) ; Stone v. Jackson,
109 Tex. 385, 210 S. W. 953 (1919) ; Davis v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 134 Tex. 201,
134 S. W. (2d) 1042 (Tex. Com. App. 1946); Griffin v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 133
Tex. 45, 125 S. W. (2d) 545 (Tex. Com. App. 1939) ; "The right and power of the
survivor of the community estate to sell same without administration to pay a com-
munity debt has been so long and so oftimes recognized that it has become a rule
of property in Texas no longer open to question," Kinard v. Sims, 53 S. W. (2d) 803,
804 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932). Writ of error refused.
5 Shell Oil Co., Inc. v. Howth, Davis v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., Griffin v. Stano.
lind Oil & Gas Co., supra, note 4; Clemmons v. McDowell, 5 S. W. (2d) 224 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1928), affirmed, 12 S. W. (2d) 995 (Tex. Com. App. 1929); Southern
Underwriters v. Lewis, 150 S. W. (2d) 162 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941) ; Williams v. Davis,
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is related, performing other contractual obligations which bind the
former community. 6 The survivor's action in so doing, if within a
reasonable time, is binding upon the children, who, with the sur-
vivor, retain their proportionate interest in any residue left. The
conveyance must be for the purpose of paying community debts,'
or at least, community debts must exist; and it cannot be in fraud
of the children! If such debts exist, the buyer takes good title free
thereof, though the proceeds are not used to pay the debts; the
same result follows, under the same facts, with an independent
executor. The amount of the debt and the value of the property
conveyed are immaterial except for their influence on the ques-
tion of fraud.9 That the debt was not yet due, that enough per-
sonality existed with which the debt might have been paid, that
errors of judgment were committed do not impair the right of the
survivor to sell.'" There is, however, no authority in the survivor
to give away former community property or exchange it unless
133 S. W. (2d) 275 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939) ; First National Bank of Bowie v. Phillips,
101 S. W. (2d) 319 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936) writ of error dismissed.
6 Garnett v. Jobe, 70 Tex. 696, 8 S. W. 505 (1888); Long v. Walker, 47 Tex. 173
(1877) ; Prim v. Barton, 18 Tex. 206 (1856) ; Stramler v. Coe. 15 Tex. 211 (1855) ;
McCombs v. Abrams, 28 S. W. (2d) 584 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930), a/Id 48 S. W. (2d)
612 (Tex. Com. App. 1932) ; Carey v. Texas Pacific Coal & Oil Co., 237 S. W. 309 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1921), where lease was binding obligation on community, wife, as survivor,
had power to accept delay rentals and continue lease in force.
7 No community debt where conveyance made in consideration of defense of adult
son against murder charge three years after husband's death, Shell Oil Co., Inc. v.
Howth, supra, note 4; no power where assets all cash and no debts existed, Grebe v.
First State Bank of Bishop, supra, not 4; or, where it was agreed the comn unity
owed no debts, White v. Baker, 118 S. W. (2d) 319 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938) ; see Burn-
ham v. Hardy Oil Co., 108 Tex. 555, 195 S. W. 1139 (1917).
8 Griffin v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., supra, not 4; Walston v. Gibson, 141 S. W.
(2d) 997 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940) writ of error refused; Williams v. Davis, supra, note 5.
Cf. Lipsitz v. Rice, 233 S. W. 594 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921) where jury found fraud.
9 Griffin v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., supra, note 4, debt of $10.32 due for taxes
when oil and gas lease executed by the survivor; no showing of value of lease other
than cash down payment of $10.00. Nor does the fact that the sale was made not
solely for debts invalidate it, Cage v. Tucker's Heirs, 29 Tex. Civ. App. 586, 69 S. W.
425 (1902), and Clemmons v. McDowell, 12 S. W. (2d) 955 (Tex. Com. App. 1929),
at 956: "... it having been shown at the time the survivor conveyed the land it was
encumbered by a community obligation which was assumed and paid by the pur-
chaser, the conveyance, as a matter of law, regardless of the motive the survivor may
have had in making the deed, was to pay a community debt."
10 Kinard v. Sims, supra, note 4.
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
such exchange is for the purpose of settling or paying debts;"
and there seems to be no authority in the survivor to sell it for
necessaries."
The survivor may renew, revive or secure community debts,"
and the fact that limitations have run against a debt does not
vitiate the power of the survivor to sell and convey for the purpose
of paying the barred debt.' 4 The power in the community survivor
is a general power, and it is not necessary that reference to the
power be made in instruments executed by the survivor under this
authority;'" better practice would seem to include a reference,
however. The parties may purposely stipulate that, even though
debts do exist, the individual capacity is to govern, e. g., where a
widow and child convey as "sole heirs;"' 6 where the grantee un-
dertakes to purchase from the husband as owner and insists the
heirs be joined as such;17 or, where the surviving husband and five
children join in a deed naming the grantors as individuals, the
interest of a sixth child is not conveyed."
Are the Rights of a Surviving Wife Equal
To Those of a Surviving Husband?
As a general rule, either the surviving husband or the surviving
wife can exercise the power, without court action, to sell to pay
". Bordages v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 129 S. W. (2d) 786 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938)
writ of error dismissed, judgment correct.
12 Littleton v. Giddings, 47 Tex. 109 (1877); Brown v. Elmendorf, 25 S. W. 145
(Tex. Civ. App. 1894), af'd 87 Tex. 56, 26 S. W. 1043 (1894) ; Booth v. Clark, 34
Tex. Civ. App. 315, 78 S. W. 392 (1904).
18 First Nat'l Bank of Bowie v. Phillips, 101 S. W. (2d) 319 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936)
writ of error dismissed; Bell v. Pirtle, 69 S. W. (2d) 476 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934) .
14 Stone v. Jackson, supra, note 4; Stramler v. Coe, supra, note 6; Walston v. Gib-
son, supra, note 8; Kauffman v. Hahn, 59 S. W. (2d) 435 (Texas Civ. App. 1933);
Alldredge v. Wilson, 268 S. W. 1045 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925) Cf. First Natl. Bank of
Bowie v. Phillips, supra, note 13; Cf. revival of barred debt by an executor or admin-
istrator, which is said to be a prima facie fraud and not binding upon the heirs.
15 Davis v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., supra, note 4; Humble Oil & Refining Co. v.
Lloyd, 108 S. W. (2d) 213 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937) writ of error refused; Bell v. Pirtle,
supra. note 13.
16 Mariposa Land & Cattle Co. v. Sullivan, 87 Tex. 142, 26 S. W. 978 (1894).
17 Willacy Co. Water Control & Improvement Dist. No. 1 v. Hofer, 149 S. W. (2d)
1114 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941).
is Meyers v. Crenshaw, 116 S. W. (2d) 1125 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938), aff'd. 134 Tex.
500, 137 S. W. (2d) 7 (Tex. Com. App. 1940).
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community debts; but a distinction has been established because
of the differing individual liabilities of the spouses. for commu-
nity obligations. The husband being personally liable for more of
the community debts, ordinarily, than the wife is, 9 his right to
exercise the powers of the community survivor is superior to the
right of the administrator of the wife's estate,2° although where
the husband makes no effort to exercise the power his having the
mere superior right does not prevent another from doing so.2
The husband's liability for community debts being ordinarily
more extensive than the wife's, the administrator of his estate re-
quires, and is given, a superior right to manage and control the
assets of the former community to the exclusion of the surviving
wife whose power is suspended during such administration;2 she
cannot sell even to pay debts, but her power is restored when the
administration of the deceased husband's estate is closed. Where
the wife is administrator of her husband's estate her power as com-
munity survivor is likewise suspended," and she should be dealt
with as administratrix and not as the survivor of the community.
When the wife has qualified under the statutes and is subse-
quently remarried, her control ceases and the estate becomes sub-
ject to regular administration. 4 By analogy, her powers as non-
qualifying community survivor are similarly suspended during
'9 See comment in this issue, The Liability of Marital Property for the, Contracts
and Torts of Husband and Wife.
20 Stone v. Jackson, supra, note 4; Carleton v. Goebler, 94 Tex. 93, 58 S .W. 829
(1900) ; Moody v. Smoot, 78 Tex. 119, 14 S. W. 285 (1890) ; Good v. Coombs, 28 Tex.
35 (1866) ; Primm v. Barton, 18 Tex. 206 (1856) ; Chanowsky v. Friedman, 205 S. W.
(2d) 641 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947), writ of error refused, n.r.e. Levy v. W. L Moody &
Co., 87 S. W. 205 (Tex. Civ. App. 1905) writ of error refused.
21 Chanowsky v. Friedman, 219 S. W. (2d) 501 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949).
22 Matula v. Freytag, 101 Tex. 357, 107 S. W. 536 (1908) ; Corzinne v. Williams, 85
Tex. 499, 22 S. W. 399 (1893); Hollingsworth v. Davis, 62 Tex. 438 (1884) ; Moke v.
Brackett, 28 Tex. 443 (1866); Tucker v. Brackett, 28 Tex. 337 (1866); Knight v.
Tannehill Bros., 140 S. W. (2d) 552 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940) writ of error dismissed,
judgment correct; Latham v. Dawson, 40 Tev. Civ. App. 219, 89 S. W. 315 (1905) no
writ.
2 8 Wingfield v. Hackney. 95 Tex. 490. 68 S. W. 262 (1902).
2 4 T. Ra,. Crv. STAT. (Vernon's 1948) art. 3680.
1950]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
the continuation of the second marriage,2" but are restored upon
its dissolution.26
Relation of Non-Qualifying Survivor to Creditors and Heirs
The rights of a survivor and the heirs are fixed at the time of
the death of the other spouse, and all subsequent transactions must
be undertaken subject to those rights as well as to the liabilities of
the estate. The liabilities of the survivor arise on his own account
and not because of the death of the other spouse. As noted, a sur-
viving husband is usually personally liable for many more com-
munity debts than is a surviving wife.27 Subsequent acts may give
rise to a personal liability which did not exist prior to the termi-
nation of the marriage, e. g., to the extent that a survivor appro-
priates to his own use either separate property of the deceased or
former community property which would otherwise be liable to
creditors, equity will impose a personal obligation for the debt.
2 s
However, since the estate vests immediately on death and the sur-
vivor and heirs are entitled to possession, subject to the debts of
the decedent, the use or disposition by them must be found to be
inconsistent with the superior rights of creditors and to defeat the
latter's right to reach and apply the property to the debt.
29
Where the survivor discharges community obligations from his
own separate property, he is entitled to reimbursement from the
25 Sunmerville v. King, 98 Tex. 332, 83 S. W. 680 (1904) ; Auerbach v. Wylie, 84
Tex. 618, 19 S. W. 856 (1892), (Fisher, J. dissenting, 20 S. W. 776) ; Davis v. Mc-
Cartney, 64 Tex. 584 (S. Ct. 1885) ; Knight v. Tannehill Bros., supra, note 17.
28 Summerville v. King, Id.; Knight v. Tannehill Bros., supra, note 22.
27 Stone v. Jackson, supra, note 4; Clemmons v. McDowell, supra, note 5.
28 Solomon v. Skinner, 82 Tex. 345, 18 S. W. 698 (1891) ; Low v. Felton, 84 Tex.
378, 19 S. W. 693 (1892); Schmidtke v. Miller, 71 Tex. 103, 8 S. W. 638 (1892);
Mayes v. Jones, 62 Tex. 365 (1884); Webster v. Willis, 56 Tex. 468 (1882); Mc-
Campbell v. Henderson, 50 Tex. 601 (1879) ; Patterson v. Allen, 50 Tex. 23 (1878) ;
Ingram v. Dowling, 11 S. W. (2d) 325 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928); Rex Supply Co. v.
Shepherd, 293 S. W. 342 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927) writ of error refused; Hurst v. Craw-
ford. 216 S. W. 284 (Tex. Civ. App. 1919).
29 Blinn v. McDonald, 92 Tex. 604, 46 S. W. 787, 48 S. W. 571, 50 S. W. 931 (1899);
Kauffman v. Wooters, 79 Tex. 205, 13 S. W. 549 (1890); Embree-McLean Carriage
Co. v. Johnson. 85 S. W. 1021 (Tex. Civ. App. 1905); Middleton v. Pipkin. 56 S. W.
240 (Tex. Civ. App. 1900).
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assets of the former community estate, provided it is done fairly
and not to the detriment of the remainder of the estate. 0
The heirs and the surviving spouse stand as tenants in common
of the former community estate, subject to claims against the
estate and to the survivor's power to dispose of it to settle those
claims. Absent facts giving rise to such power, the survivor has
no superior rights in the estate. As a tenant in common, he is en-
titled to the use and possession of the property"' where his use is
reasonable and proper and there is no excluding the heirs. The
position of the survivor is often spoken of as that of a trustee,
when he has exceeded his authority. If he continues in possession
and management where the debts have been settled and the admin-
istration, if any, has been closed, he cannot use the former com-
munity assets for private gains, and any profits or increases accru-
ing therefrom must be shared with the heirs."
Too, the survivor may convey his own undivided interest in his
individual capacity. If he or she purports to convey full title to a
specific portion of the former community estate, the conveyance
is valid if the children may secure their just share from the re-
mainder. This amounts to an "equitable partition," and rules of
equity govern.8 Of course, the parties may partition by agreement
or suit, but in any event, the rights of creditors must be preserved.
80 Davis v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., supra, note 4; Leatherwood v. Arnold, 66 Tex.
414, 1 S. W. 173 (1886) ; Williford v. Simpson, 217 S. W. 191 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920) ;
Kerens Natl. Bank v. Stockton, 281 S. W. 580 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926), rev'sd on other
grounds, 120 Tex. 546, 40 S. W. (2d) 7 (1931; Suggs v. Singly, 167 S. W. 241 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1914) ; Jennings v. Barton, 98 S. W. 445 (Tex. Civ. App. 1906) writ of error
relused; Davis v. Harmon, 9 Tex. Civ. App. 356, 29 S. W. 492 (Tex. Civ. App. 1895).
81 Akin v. Jefferson, 65 Tex. 137 (1885) (Survivor leasing land or hiring stock out
to others is accountable to heirs, but not for his own reasonable use); Lumpkin v.
Murrell, 46 Tex. 51 (1876) ; Spencer v. Pettit, 2 S. W. (2d) 422 (Tex. Com. App.
1928) (Survivor's use and occupation approved, but disposition disapproved even
absent fraudulent intent; held as "constructive trustee" for proceeds.); Citizens Sav-
ings Bank & Trust Co. v. Spencer, 105 S. W. (2d) 671 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937) writ ol
error dismissed, 110 S. W. (2d) 1151; Whitham & Co. v. Donovan, 11 S. W. (2d)
197 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928).
82 Grebe v. First State Bank of Bishop, supra, note 4; First Natl. Bank v. Phillips,
101 S. W. (2d) 319 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937) writ of error dismissed; Garcia v. Garcia,
4 S. W. (2d) 257 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928) writ of error dismissed.
58 Heller v. Heller, 114 Tex. 401, 269 S. W. 771 (1925) ; Peak v. Swindle, 68 Tex.
242, 4 S. W. 478 (1887); Arnold v. Cauble, 49 Tex.-527 (1878); Clements v. Maury,
1950]
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Rights of Purchasers From a Non-Qualifying Survivor
When a purchaser is called upon to defend a conveyance to him
from the non-qualifying survivor, the actualities of the situation
under which the conveyance was made will vary the burden im-
posed upon the parties involved. The property might have been
community property and considered as such; it might have been
community property but legal title might have been in the sur-
viving spouse; or, it might have been the separate property of the
deceased spouse which was presumed to be community. In the
first and last instances, where the property is disposed of as com-
munity, the conveyance must be for the purpose of paying com-
munity debts, or at least such debts must exist; while in the second
instance, where the legal title stands in the survivor, it will be
seen that the existence of debts may be immaterial.
When the property was community and is conveyed for the pur-
pose of paying community debts, the purchaser has the burden of
establishing the facts authorizing the disposition when attacked by
the heirs. 4 He need not show that the proceeds were used for pay-
ing debts, but he must have no notice of any intention of the sur-
vivor to misapply the proceeds and must not be a party to any
fraud or collusion with the survivor. If community debts exist, if
the property was community, and the seller is the community sur-
vivor, the disposition will be sustained unless bad faith or fraud
is shown by the attacking heirs." Where the lapse of time between
the conveyance and the suit attacking the conveyance is so great
as to make direct proof of the existence of the power improbable,
a presumption will be indulged that the conveyance was for the
purpose of paying community debts."
50 Tex. Civ. App. 158, 110 S. W. 185 (1908) writ of error refused; Williams v. Ember.
son, 22 Tex. Civ. App. 522, 55 S. W. 595 (1900).
84 Proetzel v. Schroeder, 83 Tex. 684, 19 S. W. 292 (1892); Moody v. Butler, 63
Tex. 210 (1885); Johnson v. Harrison, 48 Tex. 257 (1887); Bordages v. Stanolind,
supra, note 11; Stone v. Light, 228 S. W. 1108 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920); Iiams v. Mager,
216 S. W. 422 (Tex. Civ. App. 1919); Eastham v. Sims, 11 Tex. Civ. App. 133, 32
S. W. 359 (1895).
85 Clemmons v. McDowell, 5 S. W. (2d) 224 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928) af'd. 12 S. W.
(2d) 955 (Tex. Com. App. 1929).
86 Hensel v. Kegans, 79 Tex. 347, 15 S. W. 275 (1891) ; Clemmons v. McDowell,
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As pointed out, a conveyance by the survivor where no power
exists can be sustained as a conveyance of the survivor's interest,
and the purchaser will be protected as far as the equities will
admit. It has been held that such a conveyance from the survivor
may be ratified by the heirs;7 that the survivor may settle with
the heirs either from the former community estate88 or from the
survivor's separate property;39 and that a settlement with the heirs
by the survivor will inure to the benefit of the purchaser.4"
Where the disputed property was, at the time of the conveyance,
actually former community property but legal title thereto stood
in the survivor, a bona fide purchaser from the survivor without
notice of the community character of the property takes good title
as against the heirs, and under these circumstances the existence
of community debts is immaterial.4' This is but another example
of a bona fide purchaser without notice prevailing over hidden
equities and is not peculiar to the unqualified survivor's powers.
Of course, where the purchaser (or mortagee) has notice of the
community character of the property his protection is diminished
and he will take only the interest of the survivor.42 But the burden
supra, note 33; Caddell v. Lufkin Land & Lumber Co., 255 S. W. 397 (Tex. Com.
App. 1923) ; Bordages v. Stanolind Oil & Gas, supra, note 11. As to what period must
elapse to give rise to the presumption, it has been said that the period is the same
as where a deed would be admitted into evidence as an ancient instrument without
proof of execution, Brown v. Elmendorf, 25 S. W. 145 (Tex. Civ. App. 1894); twenty
to thirty years seem to be sufficient. It is to be noted that the period elapsing between
the death of a spouse and the conveyance by the survivor, as distinguished from that
between the conveyance and the suit attacking it, would appear to have the opposite
effect. See Taylor v. Taylor, 26 S. W. 889 (Tex. Civ. App. 1894), affd in part, 88 Tex.
47, 29 S. W. 1057 (1895).
87 Barkley v. Stone, 195 S. W. 925 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917) writ of error refused.
as Brown v. Elmendorf, supra, note. 36.
89 Long v. Moore, 48 S. W. 43 (Tex. Civ. App. 1898) writ of error refused.
40 Randolph v. Junker, 1 Tex. Civ. App. 517, 21 S. W. 551 (1892).
41 Patty v. Middleton, 82 Tex. 586 (1891) ; Hand v. Errington, 242 S. W. 722 (Tex.
Com. App. 1922); Downing v. Jeffrey, 173 S. W. (2d) 241 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943)
writ of error refused, w. m.; Ashcroft v. Fleming, 168 S. W. (2d) 304 (Tex. Civ. App.
1942). affd 142 Tex. 41. 175 S. W. (2d) 401 (1943).
42 Gough v. H. 0. L. C., 135 S. W. 771 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939) writ of error dis-
missed, judgment correct; White v. Baker, supra, note 7; Lipsitz v, Rice, supra, note 8;




is upon the heirs or the grantees of their equitable interests to
establish notice of the purchaser as to the community nature of
the property.4
The most far-reaching effect given to a survivor's conveyance is
where the property is actually the separate property of the de-
ceased spouse but falls within the presumptions that all property
acquired during the marriage, and also all property possessed by
the spouses at dissolution of the marriage, is community property.
If debts exist which would authorize the survivor to dispose of the
former community property and there is nothing to give notice to a
bona fide purchase as to the realities, such purchaser is entitled
to rely upon the presumption of community property and to pur-
chase from the survivor." Here again the disposition must be for
the purpose of paying community debts or at least such debts must
exist, but there is some authority to the effect that where no such
debts exist, the conveyance by the survivor will pass one-half of
the property, which is what the survivor apparently had title to
under the presumption that the property was community. What
constitutes notice under this and the above circumstances is gen-
erally in accord with the requirements for notice in any other sitit-
ation and offers nothing unique.45
43 Marshburn v. Stewart, 113 Tex. 507, 254 S. W. 942 (Tex. Com. App. 1924);
Elliott v. Wallace, 59 S. W. (2d) 109 (Tex. Com. App. 1933) ; Buckalew v. Butcher.
Arthur, Inc., 214 S. W. (2d) 184 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948) writ of error refused, n.r.e.
44 Word v. Box, 66 Tex. 596, 3 S. W. 93 (1886); Marshburn v. Stewart, supra,
note 41; Roswurm v. Sinclair Prairie Oil Co., 181 S. W. (2d) 736 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944)
writ of error refused, w.m.; Mayor v. Breeding, 24 S. W. (2d) 542 (Tex. Civ. App.
1930) writ of error refused; Sanburn v. Schuler, 22 S. W. 119 (Tex. Civ. App. 1893)
writ of error denied, with opinion, 86 Tex. 116, 23 S. W. 641 (1893).
45 Generally speaking, see Buckalew v. Butcher-Arthur, Inc., supra, note 43, at
page 194; that purchaser bound only "... (1) to investigate the records of instru-
ments affecting the title... (2) to determine whether the land was in possession,
and ... what rights were claimed by the possessor, and (3) ... to pursue the inquiry
suggested by any fact known to him which 'would have prompted a prudent man,
desirous to protect himself and willing to act fairly with others', to make a further
investigation of the title and which if followed up would have led to the knowledge
of the equitable right of [the heirs]."
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II. THE QUALIFIED COMMUNITY SURVIVOR
The Mechanics of Qualifying
Either spouse, within four years after the death of the other,
makes application to the county court for appointment." The
application must show that there is a child or children and that
there is a community estate.47 The county court appoints apprais-
ers,48 who make an inventory listing all property, debts and
claims;49 and the survivor files a bond equal to the value of the
whole community estate. The court then enters an order author-
izing the survivor to control, manage and dispose of the commu-
nity estate.5
What Are the Comparative Rights of the
Surviving Husband and Wife to Administer
The Former Community Estate?
A statute 2 defines the rights of a surviving wife as being equal
to those of a surviving husband, where both qualify under the
statutes. However, their rights differ materially in a few in-
stances, e. g., where each remarries (discussed infra) and where
the deceased husband has left a will. While a surviving husband
has an absolute right to administer the former community prop-
erty, a surviving wife possesses this right only in case the de-
ceased husband does not leave a will. 3
If he leaves a will, the Supreme Court held in Carlton v.
Goebler,5 ' that his executor is entitled to administer the former
community estate. This seems to definitely preclude qualification
by the surviving wife while such administration is pending.55 In
46Tx. REv. Ctv. STAT. (Vernon. 1948) Art. 3664.
47 ibid.
48 Id., art. 3665.
49 Id., art. 3666.
50 Id., art. 3667.
51 Id., art. 3668.
52 Id., art. 3678.
53 Matula v. Freyta2, 101 Tex. 357. 107 S. W. 536 (1908).
54 94 Tex. 93. 58 S. W. 829 (1900).
55 Nations v. Neighbors, 201 S. W. 691 (Tex. Civ. App., 1918), writ of error refused.
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Lovejoy v. Cockrell" the deceased husband left a will, the inde-
pendent executor qualified and conveyed former community prop-
erty. The surviving wife brought suit to recover the property,
alleging that the executor had no right to sell it, since it was for-
merly community property. The Commission of Appeals, in deny-
ing her claim, said that since the former community property is
chargeable with the husband's debts, it is considered as part of
his estate when there is an administration of such estate.
On the other hand, though a deceased wife left a will and an
executor qualifies thereunder, the surviving husband has the abso-
lute right to administer the former community property without
interference.57
At least a partial justification for this difference in the rights of
the surviving husband and wife lies in the fact that the husband
is for the most part the community manager, and ordinarily cre-
ates more community debts than does the wife.
Are Debts Necessary for Conveyance byQualified Community Survivors?
The statutes"s state that the qualified survivor shall have the
right of absolute control and disposition of the former commu.
nity property.
This provision seems very clear, but a considerable amount of
litigation hag arisen as to whether community debts are necessary
to enable such a qualified survivor to convey the former commu-
nity property. In Brunson v. Yount-Lee Oil Co."' the Supreme
Court held that the existence of such debts is not prerequisite,
and that this right to convey includes the homestead.
This broad right seems to be balanced by the requirement that
56 44 S. W. (2d) 1040 (Tex. Civ. App., 1931); affirmed in 63 S. W. (2d) 1009,
(Tex. Comm. App. 1933).
57 Moody v. Smoot, 78 Tex. 119, 14 S. W. 285 (1890); Cullers v. May, 81 Tex.
110, 16 S .W. 813 (1891); Levy v. W. L. Moody & Co., 87 S. W. 205 (Tex. Civ. App.,
1905), writ of error refused.
58 TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. (Vernon's, 1948). art. 3669.
59 56 S. W. (2d) 1073 (1933), affirming 32 S. W. (2d) 893 (Tex. Civ. App., 1930).
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the surviving spouse must post a bond, equal to the value of the
former community property in order to qualify."0 By this provi-
sion the creditors and heirs are protected in case the property is
improperly disposed of. It should be noted that this bond is some-
what similar to that required of executors who are not independ-
ent and of administrators.6 '
Must the Qualified Survivor Refer to
His Power When He Conveys?
The statutes 2 provide that a certified copy of the court order
authorizing the administration will be evidence of the right of the
qualified community survivor. Must a reference be made to such
order in a deed, to make the latter valid?
The Texas rule seems to be fully and clearly stated in Conrad
v. Hill,"3 although this is not a case involving conveyance by a
community survivor. The Supreme Court said that a trustee or
donee of a power may execute it by an instrument which does not
refer to said power, but in order to make the execution valid, it
must appear (from the instrument or the circumstances) that the
donee did act in pursuance of this power, and that it was his in-
tention to dispose of the property in accordance with its terms.
The court further said if from the circumstances or the instru-
ment the intention of the trustee or donee is doubtful, it will not
be held that by such conveyance the power was exercised. The
case of McGraw v. Merchants and Planters National Bank" adopt-
ed the rule of the Conrad case, again emphasizing that the instru-
ment or surrounding circumstances must show the intention of the
survivor to exercise the power granted by the probate court. The
qualified survivor there executed deeds of trust that contained no
express reference to the community administration, yet as the lan-
6OTEx. REv. Civ. STAT. (Vernon's, 1948), art. 3667.
61 Id, art. 3386.
62 Id., art. 3669.
63 91 Tex. 341. 43 S. W. 789 (1897).
64 34 S. W. (2d) 633 (Tex. Civ. App., 1930) writ of error refused.
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guage used was general, without any reservation, the court said it
reasonably appeared that the survivor intended to impose a lien
on the children's half of the tract, as well as on his own half.
Todd v. Shell Petroleum Co.65 is in accord with the case just dis-
cussed. Quite possibly a conveyance in general language without
reference to the survivor's power would be an exercise thereof,
even though there actually was no intent to exercise it.
What Is the Effect of Remarriage by Widow Who
Has Qualified as Community Administrator?
The surviving widow, by virtue of Article 3678,66 has the same
right to administer the former community estate upon qualifying
as has the surviving husband. However, Article 36807 provides
that upon her remarriage this right will be forfeited and "the
estate shall be subject to administration as in other cases of de-
ceased persons' estates." This article has been the source of much
litigation, but the decisions for the most part seem to be uniform
in enforcing the forfeiture.
The case of Llano Development and Furnace Co. v. Cross8
involved a widow who had qualified as the community adminis-
tratrix but had since remarried. The court held that by virtue of
the marriage, she had lost her right to sue in her representative
capacity on a note given to her in part payment for land which
had belonged to the community even though the sale and execu-
tion of the note was before her subsequent remarriage. This prob-
lem arose again in the case of Van Ness v. Cross," where a widow
who had qualified under the statute had attempted to convey for.
mer community property for the payment of community debts
after her remarriage. The court concluded that even though the
widow had gained absolute control by qualifying, the control was
65 85 S. W. (2d) 1049 (Tex. Civ. App., 1935), writ of error refused.
66 TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. (Vernon. 1948). art. 3678.
67 Id.. art. 3680.
68 24 S. W. 77 (Tex. Civ. App., 1893).
6) 215 S. W. 272 (Tex. Civ. App.. 1919).
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lost by da remarriage, and this included even the right to sell for
the purpose of paying community debts.
Another important aspect of this problem is, what is the effect
of the dissolution of the second marriage of a widow who had
previously qualified? The Supreme Court held in Summerville v.
King" that this marriage had terminated the administration of the
widow, but that the dissolution of this marriage had the effect of
fully restoring the widow to her previous representative capacity.
By contrast, the surviving husband's remarriage after he has
qualified does not affect his powers as community administrator. 7'
The Problem of Partition and Distribution
On the death of either the husband or the wife, community
property ceases and immediately vests, if there are children, in
them and the surviving spouse as tenants in common. 2
Tenants in common may have partition as a matter of right,
78
but in the case of property that was formerly community, this
right is conditional where the survivor has qualified, due to the
latitude given to such survivor in administering the property be-
cause of his bond.7'
The statute75 clearly states that partition may be had by those
entitled thereto only after the lapse of twelve months from the
time of qualification of the survivor. It seems there is no way in
which this period may be shortened. This period of waiting is
similar to that required in the case of ordinary executors and
administrator 7 6 and also independent executors.
77
TO 98 Tex. 332. 83 S. W. 680 (1904).
71 Drought v. Story 143 S. W. 361 (Tex. Civ. App., 1912), writ of error refused.
T2 Caldwell v. Farrier, et al., 248 S. W. 425 (Tex. Civ. App., 1923) (co-tenants).
73 11 TEX. JuR., co-tenancy, § 47.
74 McFarland v. Beaton, 126 S. W. (2d) 719, (Tex. Civ. App. 1939) affirmed; 134
Tex. 652 134 S. W. (2d) 1058 (1940.
75 Tex. REv. CiV. STAT. (Vernon's. 1948). art. 3681.
76 TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. (Vernon's, 1948), art. 3602.




A method that has been used by the heirs to realize more quickly
on their inheritance is to sell to a third party. The question then
arises whether this grantee is entitled to partition. This problem is
answered in Miller v. Miller," where the grantee sought partition
before the statutory period of twelve months had passed. The
court, in refusing partition, said that the qualified survivor's right
of absolute control for twelve months could not be subordinated to
the sale by the heir; and that the grantee has only the same right
to partition as did the heir.
It should be noticed that there is nothing to prevent the interest
of such a grantee in the specific property from being wiped out
by a sale by the qualified survivor; the grantee, of course, has a
right to his proportionate share of the proceeds of the sale (unless,
of course, community debts are paid therewith).
Another aspect of the problem of partition is that the statute
does not demand that the partition be granted even though the
twelve months have lapsed. The case of Cox v. Gaines7" was an
example of the application being refused even though the statu-
tory period had passed. The estate being insolvent, the court held
the heir was not entitled to partition.
A Problem as to When the Community
Administration Is Closed
Article 36690 provides that after qualification, the survivor
shall have absolute control and disposition of the property that
was formerly community without further action by the court. This
statute, which incidentally creates another similarity between the
qualified community survivor and the independent executor,"' has
the effect of setting the administration in motion, but there is no
corresponding statute that provides for stopping it. The only
things required by the statutes are that the survivor shall pay the
78 227 S. W. 737 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921).
79 75 S. W. (2d) 172 (Tex. Civ. App., 1934).
80 TEx. REv. Civ. STA'r. (Vernon's, 1948). art. 3669.
81 Id., art. 3436.
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debts of the community, 2 keep an account of all transactions,8
act for the best interests of the community,"' and upon partition,
hand over one-half of the remaining property to the heirs of the
deceased spouse. 5 The statutes,8' as in the case of the independ-
ent executor, do not require the survivor to report to the court
where he qualified that the administration has served its purpose
and that partition has been effectuated, and do not provide for
withdrawal of the bond-which ordinarily remains on file, though
frequently uncollectible. Ordinary administrators must close with-
in one year, approximately. 7
There is no statute providing a definite duration for community
administrations. Two statutes provide that an administration may
be closed at any time, apparently, after one year, (1) by the heirs'
demanding partition and distribution,"8 or (2) by court order
following proceedings by an unpaid creditor if (and only if) there
is no property left. 9 Apparently, also, the administration would
be closed by partition initiated by the survivor."0 Unless there is
such action by heirs or such a court order or such voluntary par-
tition, the qualified survivor continues indefinitely to have the
power to convey the former community property. Drought v.
Story91 involved this exact problem; the husband, who had quali-
fied as the community administrator in 1868, conveyed the for-
mer community property 32 years later, in 1900. The court, point-
ing to the fact that the heirs had not sought partition or distribu-
tion, held that the husband had the power to convey good title to
582 d., art. 3672.
83 Id.. art. 3670.
84 Id.. art. 3669.
85 Id.. art. 3670.
86 Id., art. 3669.
87 Id, art. 3643.
88 Id.. art. 3681.
89 Id.. art. 3674.
90 Drought v. Story, supra. note 71.
9' 143 S. W. 361 (Tex. Civ. App., 1912), writ of error rejused. This case was de-
cided under a slightly different statute, but not different as to this question.
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the property. Tholl v. Speer" and Todd v. Shell Petroleum Co.,"
involving conveyances 17 years and 18 years later, respectively,
are in accord.
The lack of a definite time limit for closing community admin-
istrations is a source of trouble and uncertainty where one takes
from a former community administrator when the administration
has been closed and partition and distribution have taken place.
It is important that a purchaser take all possible precautions in
his dealings with the survivor-such as obtaining joinder of all
the heirs in the survivor's conveyance, and making an inspection
to ascertain who is in possession of the land and under whom he is
holding.
It would seem desirable for the legislature to set some time limit
for closing community administrations, or at least to require the
filing of a simple notice of such closing.
Eldon R. Vaughan
A. W. Davis
92 230 S. W. 453 (Tex. Civ. App., 1921).
93 85 S. W. (2d) 1049 (Tex. Civ. App., 1935), writ of error refused.
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